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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The optimal commodity tax system is the one which minimizes the aggre­
gate loss of taxpayers' well-being for any given amount of tax revenue. 
The first analytical formulation and solution of the problem appears in 
the celebrated article by Ramsey [19]. This original analysis considered 
the problem according to the criterion of economic efficiency. Recently, 
the theory has been extended to take account of both distributional and ef­
ficiency considerations [4, 9, 17]. Most analyses have been limited to 
consideration of single excise taxes levied in an economy which consists 
only of perfectly competitive industries. As a result, the major focus has 
been on the optimal configuration of excise rates among industries. That 
is, whether a uniform or a differential excise rate structure is required 
[3, 10, 11, 19, 20, 21, 22]. 
This paper examines the optimal taxation of an economy when both per­
fectly and imperfectly competitive industries exist together. In such a 
world, there is no configuration of single excise rates which satisfies the 
optimal commodity taxation problem. Rather, a combination of taxes is gen­
erally required for optimal taxation of imperfectly competitive industries. 
Therefore, in this paper, the major focus is on the type of tax or combina­
tion of taxes required for optimal taxation of industries with various de­
grees of competitiveness. The choice of tax instruments is expanded to in­
clude license fees (L) in addition to unit (t) and ad valorem (s) excise 
taxes. Excise taxes enter the analysis in the usual manner as differences 
between prices paid by buyers and the net receipts of sellers. License 
fees are treated as taxes on the existence of firms in an industry. 
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Licenses can either be sold at a fixed price to a market-determined number 
of firms or a fixed number can be auctioned off at a market-determined 
price. If the market for licenses is perfectly competitive, both methods 
of selling have the same impact on the industry equilibrium. Consequently, 
for expository efficiency, we will assume that licenses are issued at a 
fixed price per firm. License fees are similar to, but different from, 
lump-sum taxes. Like lump-sum taxes, they are a fixed amount which is in­
dependent of the size of the firm, the choice of inputs, and the quantity 
and price of output, but, unlike a truly lump-sum tax, license fees can be 
avoided by going out of business. The optimal taxation of three types of 
industries is analyzed: a perfectly competitive industry, a monopolisti-
cally competitive industry, and a single-plant monopolist. Within monopo­
listic competition, there are two distinct industry equilibria considered. 
Chamberlin [8] noted the differences between equilibria with and without 
price competition. The former is characterized by a large number of rela­
tively small firms, each of which perceive that its own price changes have 
no impact on rivals. That is, each firm believes it can pursue an indepen­
dent pricing policy. In contrast, nonprice competition is characterized by 
firms who correctly realize that their rivals will react to their actions. 
Chapter II introduces the basic properties of optimal commodity taxa­
tion as discussed by Ramsey, and extends his analysis to include the deter­
mination of the conditions which must be satisfied if the economy consists 
of both perfectly and imperfectly competitive industries. It is shown that 
optimal taxation of the economy requires each particular industry to be 
moved along its optimal path. Therefore, each type of competitive 
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structure is considered separately in Chapters III-V. While a long-run 
partial-equilibrium approach is utilized, the results are easily extended 
to the general (economy-wide) optimal taxation problem. For each market 
structure, the characteristics of its optimal path are described. That is, 
the optimal adjustment of output per-firm, industry sales, and the number 
of firms, as tax collections are increased, is determined. The tax or 
combination of taxes which move each industry along this optimal path is 
then derived. Maximal taxation schemes are also examined. There has been 
surprisingly little analysis of the maximum revenue potential of single 
excise taxes (except for papers by Bishop [6] and Adams [l]) and (to our 
knowledge) no analysis of the revenue potential of multiple taxes applied 
to specific commodities. Finally, Chapter VI briefly summarizes our con­
clusions. 
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CHAPTER II. THE GENERAL OPTIMAL TAXATION PROBLEM 
In a first-best world, pareto optimality requires marginal cost pric­
ing and this is satisfied, in the absence of taxation, by perfectly com­
petitive markets. Imagine a public sector that has a fixed revenue con­
straint which must be satisfied by taxation. With the exception of lump­
sum taxes which do not affect the marginal conditions, taxation generally 
distorts pareto optimality. Therefore, barring the use of lump-sum taxes, 
the public sector must choose that particular combination of commodity 
taxes levied at appropriate rates so that the resulting welfare loss from 
the distortions away from pareto optimality is minimized for any required 
collections level. This is the optimal taxation problem, which was first 
formally analyzed by Ramsey. His basic conclusion can be explained by con­
sidering the following model. 
A Perfectly Competitive Economy 
Suppose an economy produces n commodities, x^  (i=l...n), in perfectly 
competitive markets. Let P^ (x^ ) represent the inverse demand function for 
the i^  ^commodity (where P^  is the price of commodity i). Then, define so­
cial utility (U) as the sum of the gross benefits (measured in terms of the 
numeraire, y) yielded by consumption of all goods, or 
» f"' (II-l) U= Z ( P (k,)dk. + y. 
i=l J 111 
0 
Consumers' equilibria require that their total endowment, z (measured in 
units of y) must be exhausted either on y or on outlays for all x^  consumed. 
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The outlays are the sum of the total resource cost of each commodity 
(Ci(Xi)) and total taxes paid (R). That is, 
n _ n _ 
(II-2) z = y + Z c.(x,) +R or y = z - % c.(x.) - R. 
i=l i=l  ^ 1 
Substituting y from equation (II-2) into equation (II-l) yields the social 
welfare function (W) which the public sector desires to maximize for any 
given collections level, R. That is, 
+ z - R. 
n r i n 
(II-3) W= E / P.(k.)dk - S c.(x,) 
i=l 1 1 i=l 1 1 
Social welfare is defined by equation (II-3) assuming the public sector 
squanders the tax revenue. That is, the use of R by the public sector does 
not affect social welfare. Alternatively, one can assume that R is rebated 
in a lump-sum fashion, in which case 
n r^ i n 
(II-3a) W = E / P.(k.)dk - E c.(x.) + z. 
i=l  ^  ^ i=l 1 1 
While the choice between these methods of revenue disposal do imply differ­
ent levels of social welfare, the difference does not affect the marginal 
conditions and, therefore, the conclusions concerning optimal taxation. 
Total tax collections are equal to the sum of the n industries' gross (of 
tax) profits provided all markets are characterized by free entry so that 
net (of tax) supply prices are driven to average costs. Therefore, 
n 
(II-4) R = [Pi(Xi)Xi - Ci(xpj 
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The problem, then, is to determine a taxation scheme which satisfies (II-4) 
and maximizes (II-3a). We can formulate the problem in terms of the fol­
lowing Lagrangean function: 
n r*i n 
= E I P (k )dk, - E c (x ) + z 
i=l JQ  ^  ^ 1 1=1 1 i 
+  ^ ""i " Ci(*i)) • 
Let mc^  and mr^  represent respectively the marginal cost and marginal reve-"^  
nue of commodity i. Then, (II-5) is maximized when 
(II-5a) = ^ i" ^ '^ i" ^ (®^ i - *Ci) = ° i=l...n, 
and (II-5b) -^  = R - E = 0. 
Equations (II-5a) and II-5b) can be solved for the optimal values of 
each industry's output and X (i.e., x^ * ... x^ * and X*). While these equa­
tions provide the optimal output levels and the optimal value of the con­
straint, there is no mention of tax rates here. However, the particular 
optimal taxation scheme is that which induces each industry to choose the 
appropriate output (x^ *) and yields X*. Once the values of x^ * and X* are 
known, the appropriate taxation scheme can be derived from the industry's 
(behavioral) equilibrium conditions. Moreover, the basic properties of the 
optimal taxation scheme are defined by equations (II-5a) and (II-5b). 
-5) 
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Equation (II-5b) simply limits the choice to those taxation schemes 
which can satisfy the revenue constraint (R). The n equations of (II-5a) 
provide two additional characteristics of the optimal taxation scheme. 
First, for any particular industry j, 
(II-6) Pj - mCj = x(mrj - mc^ ), 
or the deviation between price and marginal cost as a result of taxation 
must be proportional to the deviation between marginal revenue and marginal 
cost. Essentially, the marginal welfare loss (P.-mc.) must be proportional 
3 J 
to the marginal increase in tax collections (mr^  - mc^ ). This demonstrates 
the tradeoff or second best nature of optimal commodity taxation. That is, 
social welfare must be reduced as collections are increased from zero to 
their maximum. Equation (II-6) also demonstrates the basic Ramsey conclu­
sion. He related this result to the price elasticity of demand for any 
given commodity. Note that 
3P 
(II-6a) mr. = P, + x. or mr = P 
3 J oXj J J J 
where e^  is the price elasticity of demand for good x^ . Substituting this 
expression for mr^  into equation (II-6) and rearranging yields 
S X (II-6b) 1 = — where 6 = -7—7 . 
Pj ej 1-X 
This represents an alternative expression of the Ramsey conclusion. That 
is, the optimal percentage deviation between the price and marginal cost 
of any commodity will vary inversely with the commodity's price elasticity 
of demand. This implies that larger deviations between price and marginal 
8 
cost are required for commodities whose demands are relatively inelastic. 
Equation (II-6) can also be manipulated to show that, within a perfectly 
competitive economy, optimal taxation requires equal proportionate reduc­
tions of all industries' outputs below the no-tax equilibrium. Such reduc­
tions require relatively higher tax rates on commodities with relatively 
inelastic demands. 
Essentially, equation (II-6) defines the optimal taxation path for the 
industry. As the collections constraint is increased, the taxation 
scheme must adjust x^  so that the equation continues to be satisfied. That 
is, optimal taxation must move the industry along its optimal path by 
maintaining the appropriate proportion between the marginal welfare loss 
and the marginal collections gain. Equation (II-6) must similarly be satis­
fied by all other industries in the economy. That is, each industry must 
be moved along its particular optimal path. Since all n equations of (II-
5a) must be satisfied simultaneously, 
(II-7) X = —-—— for all i=l...n. 
mr^ -mc^  
This describes the final characteristic of the optimal taxation scheme; 
namely, it must equate the proportion (X) between the marginal welfare loss 
and the marginal collections gain across all n industries. Essentially, 
equation (II-6) defines the optimal taxation path for each particular in­
dustry and equation (II-7) defines the optimal taxation path for the entire 
economy. Consequently, the entire taxation scheme not only must satisfy 
the revenue constraint (equation (II-5b)) and move each particular industry 
to its optimal path (equation (II-6)), but it must also move each industry 
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to a particular point on its optimal path so that X is equated across all 
industries (equation (II-7)). 
Much of the literature on optimal commodity taxation has emphasized 
the demand aspects of the problem. This is exemplified by Ramsey's conclu­
sion concerning the demand elasticity and optimal tax rates. Supply-side 
responses have received very little attention. Commonly, analysis is 
limited to excise taxes in perfectly competitive markets, assuming fixed 
producer prices [3, 11, 17, 19, 20, 21]. Under these assumptions, the 
major issue has been whether a uniform or a differential (excise) rate 
structure is required and conclusions have been largely dependent on demand 
assumptions. 
An Imperfectly Competitive Economy 
This paper emphasizes the supply aspects of the problem by considering 
taxation in both perfectly and imperfectly competitive markets. It removes 
the assumption of fixed producer prices and allows for the use of license 
fees in addition to excise taxes. It considers whether optimal commodity 
taxation may require different tax instruments (e.g., licenses) or a com­
bination of taxes. The emphasis here is not on whether uniform or differ­
ential rates among industries are required. Rather, the focus is within 
industries and the issue is what tax or combination of taxes are required 
to move industries, characterized by various types of competitive behavior, 
to and along their optimal paths. While previous analyses have been main­
ly concerned with the optimal taxation path of the entire economy, emphasis 
here is on the optimal taxation path within particular industries. For 
each market structure analyzed, that taxation scheme which moves the 
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industry along its optimal taxation path is determined. Once it is known 
how each industry can be moved along its optimal path, the general (econo­
my-wide) solution across all industries can easily be satisfied. In com­
parison, then, while earlier analysis has been concerned with the optimal 
configuration of rates among industries, this paper considers the optimal 
tax or combination of taxes within industries. 
Specifically, this paper will consider the optimal taxation of four 
distinct industries: a perfectly competitive industry, both price and non-
price monopolistically competitive industries, and a monopoly. Let P^ (Q^ ) 
and P^ (Q^ ) represent the inverse demand function for the perfectly competi­
tive industry's good and the monopolist's good, respectively. Assume the 
perfectly competitive industry consists of a large number of firms, n^ , 
each of which produces units of output and equilibrium ensures = 
n^ q^ . Similarly, let and P2(Q2,n2) represent the inverse demand 
functions for the "composite" goods of the two monopolistically competitive 
industries. The number of firms (nu) is an argument in these demand func­
tions because the level of variety (i.e., each firm produces a distinct 
product under conditions of monopolistic competition) affects consumers' 
valuations of the quantity of the composite good consumed. Total social 
utility (U), therefore, is simply the sum of the gross benefits (measured 
in terms of the numeraire, y) yielded by consumption of all goods, or 
(II-8) U = Pj(kpdk^  + 2^(k2>n2)dk2 4 P2(k2,n2)dk2 3^ 3' 3 
0 
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Consumers' equilibria require that their total endowment, z (measured in 
units of y) must be exhausted either on y or on outlays for all con­
sumed. These outlays consist of the sum of the total production cost of 
each good and total taxes paid (R). Let q^  (i=1...3) represent output per 
firm and c^ (q^ ) (i=1...3) represent total production cost per firm. Then, 
total production cost for each industry is simply n^ c^ (q^ ) (i=1...3), or 
total production cost per firm times the number of firms in the industry. 
Alternatively, since = n^ q^  (i=1...3), total industry production cost 
can be rewritten as n^ c^. Assuming a single-plant monopolist, his to­
tal production cost is represented by c^ (Q^ ). Combining all this informa­
tion implies 
(II-9) z = y + + c^ (Q^ ) + R 
if collections are squandered, while, if collections are rebated in a lump­
sum fashion, then, 
(II-9a) z = y +,S^ n^ c.(^ ) + c^ (Q^ ). 
Assume collections are rebated, solve (II-9a) for y, and substitute into 
(II-8). This yields the social welfare function which is simply the sum 
of the consumer surpluses across all industries plus z, or 
R i^ /Qu ,02\ 
(11-10) B = / Pj(kj^ )dkj-n^ c^ (—) + PgCkg.ngidkg-ngCgt^ -) 
*'0 •'o 
•'0 ^ •'o 
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Let represent the consumers' surplus or total social welfare attributable 
to the consumption of the i^  ^good; then. 
4 
(Il-lOa) B = E B. + z 
i=l ^  
Tax collections extracted from both the perfectly competitive and monopo-
listically competitive industries will equal the gross-of-tax profits, 
since free entry is assumed. Assuming a profits tax of 100% is always 
levied on the monopolist, total economy-wide collections can be expressed 
as the sum of the gross (of tax) profits of the industries. Let repre­
sent gross industry profit for industry i. Let R represent the required 
collection level, so that 
4 
(11-11) R - E ir = 0. 
i=l 
The economy-wide optimal taxation scheme consists of those taxes required 
to maximize (Il-lOa) while satisfying (11-11). That is, the appropriate 
taxation scheme will maximize the following Lagrangean function: 
Before proceeding, it is useful to compare equation (11-12) with equation 
(II-5). Note that, in equation (11-12), is determined by the output 
levels of each industry, the number of firms existing in each industry, and 
X. In equation (II-5), was determined only by the output level of each 
industry and X. The number of firms affects both total resources cost and 
enters explicity into the demand functions of monopolistically competitive 
(11-12) /= Bj^ (Q^ ,np+B2(Q2,n2)+B3(Q3,n3)+B^ (Q^ ) + z 
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industries. Therefore, not only must the level of sales be appropriately 
adjusted, but the number of firms existing in the industry must also be 
adjusted for optimal taxation. Moreover, previously it was assumed that 
all industries were perfectly competitive. Therefore, that type of tax(es) 
which optimally adjusts any given industry will also optimally adjust the 
remaining industries. Since all industries are identically competitive, 
they will all require the same general tax scheme. The only difference 
will be the rates at which the particular taxes are levied. Alternatively, 
in equation (11-12), various types of competitive structure exist simul­
taneously. Because of this, each industry may react differently to the 
same tax. That is, a separate taxation policy may be required for each of 
the four different competitive structures. The inclusion of various mar­
ket structures, therefore, changes the major focus of optimal taxation. 
Rather than determining a single optimal tax policy for the entire economy 
and focusing on the appropriate rates to levy in each industry, the major 
focus is on the optimal tax policy for each type of competitive industry. 
Consider the conditions which must be satisfied to maximize in 
equation (11-12). Let represent the price in the i^  ^industry, 
mr^ Q^j) (mr^ (n^ )) represent the marginal revenue of industry sales (of an 
additional firm) in industry i, and let mc^ (Q^ ) (mc^ (n^ )) represent the 
marginal cost of industry sales (of an additional firm) in industry i. 
Then, if 
(II-12a) = Pj-mCj^ (Qj) - Xjmr^ (^Q^ )-mC]^ (Q^ )^] = 0 
(II-12b) = -mc^ (n^ )+ xJmCj^ (nj^ )^  = 0 
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(II-12c) Ip- = P2-mc2(Q2)-^ jjnr2(Q2)-mc2(Q2)3 = 0 
-^ 2 
(11-124)  ^  =J dk2-  Inc2(n2)-x[ inc2(n2)-mc2(n2)]  = 0  
(II-12e) "1^  = Pg- mc2(Q3)-^ [mr^ (Q3)- = 0 
"3 
3^ 
dj R spoCk-,*]) _ T 
 ^=J  ^dkg- mc3(n3)-x[mr3(n3)- mc^ Cn^ )] = 0 
(II-12g) = P^ - mc^ (Q^ )-X[mr^ (Q^ )- mc^ (Q^ )] = 0 
(II-12h) — = R - [ir^ (Q^ ,nj)-ÏÏ2(Q2,n2)-Tr3(Q3,n3)-ïï^ (Q^ )] = 0 
are simultaneously satisfied, equation (11-12) is maximized for R = R. 
These 8 equations provide the optimal values of each industry's sales 
level, number of firms, and X (i.e., Q^ *, n^ *, and X* for i=1...4). The 
optimal tax policy for each industry can be derived from the particular in­
dustry's (behavioral) equilibrium conditions. Note that equations (II-12a) 
to (II-12h) can be subdivided into the optimal conditions that must hold 
for each industry. For example, (II-12a) and (II-12b) represent the con­
ditions which must hold if the perfectly competitive industry is optimally 
taxed. 
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Previously, X was interpreted as the ratio of the marginal welfare 
loss to the marginal collections gain of an additional unit of industry 
sales (Q^ ). Since the number of firms affects both welfare and collec­
tions, X must also equal the ratio of the marginal welfare loss to the 
marginal collections gain of an additional firm in each industry.% 
The entire set of equations defines the optimal taxation path for the 
entire economy. However, they are only simultaneously satisfied if each 
particular industry's conditions are satisfied. That is, the economy is 
on its optimal path only if each separate industry is moved along its re­
spective optimal path. Consequently, before the economy can be moved along 
its optimal path, the public sector must know how to optimally tax each 
particular industry. Our analysis, therefore, will consider each industry 
separately. Once optimal tax policies for each are known, optimal taxa­
tion for the entire economy is simply a matter of using these separate 
policies so that (II-12a)-(II-12h) are simultaneously satisfied (i.e., so 
that X is equated across all industries). 
Specifically, the optimal taxation path for a given industry, j, will 
be derived by maximizing the social welfare from consumption of the jCh 
good (i.e., Bj from equation (Il-lOa)) subject to a given level of reve­
nues collected from the industry. For example, the optimal taxation path 
for the perfectly competitive industry is defined by maximizing the follow­
ing Lagrangean function: 
F^rom equation (II-12b), it may appear that X=1 always, but this is 
not true because MCj^ (nj^ )=0 at the optimum. 
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(11-13) = 
0 
Pi (kl! 
(II-13a)  ^= Pj- mc^  
(II-13b) = - mci(ni) + X 
(II-13c) = 0 .  
Note that (II-12a) = (II-13a) and (II-12b) = (II-13b). That is, the tax 
policy which satisfies (II-13a) and (II-13b) for all values of will 
yield the tax policy required to satisfy equations (11-12) and (II-12b) 
for all values of R. A similar analysis will be performed for each market 
structure. The tax policies which move all industries along their particu­
lar optimal paths are those which are then required to maximize equation 
(11-12) for the entire economy. Consequently, while each industry is con­
sidered separately (in a partial-equilibrium framework), the results are 
easily extended or applicable to the general equilibrium optimal taxation 
problem where industries of various competitive structures exist together. 
Because of the role played by the Lagrangean multiplier (X) in charac­
terizing the optimal taxation path, it is worthwhile to consider its intui­
tive interpretation and its numerical sign. To simplify, assume an economy 
which produces two goods under conditions of perfect competition. 
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If X is the only good which is taxed, then optimal taxation requires maxi­
mizing 
(11-14) P(k)dk- c(x) +z + xj^ R- (p(x)x - c(x))J 
or 
and 
0 
(II-14a) — = P - mc - X(mr-mc) - 0 
(II-14b) -^  = R - (p(x)x - c(x)) = 0. 
Equation (II-14a) defines the optimal value of X, 
(11-15) X = 
mr-mc ' 
but what exactly does X represent? A common feature of Lagrange functions 
is that the'Lâgrangean multiplier is simply the change in the objective 
function due to a marginal change in the constraint. For our purposes, 
the objective function is social welfare, or 
(11-16) B = r P(k)dk - c(x)+ z 
Jo 
and the constraint is tax collections, or 
(11-17) R = P(x)x - c(x). 
Therefore, X is simply the change in social welfare due to a marginal 
change in tax collections (i.e., X = -= ) . 
aR 
Next, consider the numerical sign of X. Essentially, we need to know 
whether R and B move directly or inversely with one another. Since both 
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are functions of output (x), their relationship can be determined by ex­
amining their relationship to output. This is illustrated in Figure II-l. 
Examination of equation (11-16) shows that B increases with x until it is 
maximized when P=mc at point w (i.e., when x = x^ ). Similarly, from equa­
tion (11-17), R is maximized when mr = mc at point T. This occurs at an 
output level (x^ ) less than that where P = mc (i.e., Xg > x^ )^ since P > mr 
at any x. Moreover, note that B exceeds R at every output level, since 
the latter is included in the former. 
The sign of X over the full range of output levels can be determined 
using equation (11-15). For output levels less than x^ , P >mr >mc so that 
\ >0. Similarly, for any output level in excess of Xg, mc >P >mr or X >0. 
Finally, X is negative whenever output is between x„ and x„ since P >mc 
while mc >mr. 
Note that the optimal taxation problem is only satisfied if A <0. If 
X >0, collections and social welfare can be simultaneously increased by 
choosing an alternative taxation scheme which appropriately adjusts output. 
For output levels less than x^ , B and R can be simultaneously increased by 
increasing output. Intuitively, both marginal social welfare (P-mc) and 
marginal tax collections (mr -mc) are positive in this range. Similarly, 
for output levels in excess of x^ , B and R can be simultaneously increased 
by reducing output. Any taxation scheme which moves the industry into 
these regions is suboptimal. One can collect more and simultaneously raise 
social welfare by moving the industry to an output level between Xj^  and x^ . 
Essentially, the industry should not operate on the wrong-side of the col­
lections mound (i.e., where x <x_) or on the wrong-side of the social 
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B(x) 
R(x) 
Figure II-l. The tax collection and social welfare functions 
Figure II-2. The Lagrangean multiplier 
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welfare mound (i.e., where x >Xg) such that X >0 and the potential for 
pareto moves exists. Therefore, X must be negative, implying that P >mc 
and mc >mr which illustrates the tradeoff problem inherent with optimal 
taxation. In order to optimally increase collections, social welfare must 
be reduced. 
Figure II-2 explicitly illustrates the relationship between X and out­
put using equation (11-15). When output is zero, P =mr, and X = 1. As 
output is increased, X increases towards +<*> at the peak of the collections 
mount where mr = mc. For a marginal increment in x in excess of x^ , X-> -*», 
since mc >mr, while P >mc. It remains negative and increases to zero when 
social welfare is maximized (i.e., P = mc). Finally, X is again positive 
for any output levels in excess of Xg, Therefore, the Lagrangean multi­
plier changes sign at the output level where the constraint is maximized 
and at the output level where the objective function is maximized. How­
ever, optimal taxation schemes move each industry only in the range where 
X <0. 
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CHAPTER III. PERFECT COMPETITION 
This chapter characterizes the optimal taxation path for a single com­
petitive industry and determines that tax or combination of taxes required 
to move the industry along its optimal path. In addition, those taxes 
which are required to maximize collections from the Industry are examined. 
In the next section, a conventional model describing a perfectly com­
petitive industry is developed. This model is used to describe the impact 
that the various taxes have on the competitive long-run equilibrium. Next, 
the optimal taxation path is derived and its characteristics are examined. 
Optimal taxation schemes are then derived and it is shown that a single ex­
cise tax is all that is required for optimal and maximal taxation. Final­
ly, the results are extended to the general equilibrium framework discussed 
in the last chapter. 
Taxation and Perfect Competition 
Imagine a perfectly competitive, constant-cost industry consisting of 
n identical firms producing a homogeneous product, q. Each firm incurs 
production cost equal to c(q) and faces a conventional u-shaped average 
cost structure, i.e., AC = Let P(Q^ ) (where P'(Q^ ) <0) represent the 
industry's inverse demand function, where is the industry quantity de­
manded and Q=nq is total industry output. Each firm maximizes profits by 
equating price to marginal cost (MC = c'(q)) while free exit and entry en­
sure that long-run economic profits (ir) are zero. Finally, the long-run 
equilibrium price, P(Q), is determined by the intersection of industry de­
mand and supply (where Qd=Q). It can be shown that unit and ad valorem 
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excise taxes have equivalent effects when levied in perfectly competitive 
markets. Therefore, analysis is simplified by considering only unit excise 
taxes and license fees. Given these assumptions, the long-run tax-inclu­
sive competitive equilibrium can be represented by two equations in two un­
knowns (Q and n) or 
(III-l) TT = P(Q)q - c(q) - tq - L = 0 
and (III-2) ir' = P(Q) - MC(q)-t = 0 where q = 
Equation (III-l) stipulates that economic profit is zero in the long-run 
and equation (III-2) states that profits are maximized. The per-unit ex­
cise rate (t) increases both marginal and average cost while the per-firm 
license fee (L) increases the fixed cost of each firm. 
In the absence of taxation, the long-run competitive equilibrium oc­
curs where P =MC =AC, or when the particular Q,n combination simultaneously 
satisfies 
(III-3) P = MC 
and (III-4) MC = AC. 
Therefore, these two equations define two loci whose intersection repre­
sents the market equilibrium in the absence of taxation. Total differen­
tiation of equations (III-3) and (III-4) yields 
(m-3a) f 
and (III-4a) 4^  
an 
- ~c"q  ^0 
P=Mc ^  " q 
= q, respectively. 
MC=AC 
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Both loci are positively-sloped in Q,n space as illustrated in Figure 
P = MC 
P = MC+t 
Figure III-l. Industry adjustment to license fees and excise taxes 
Any ray originating from the origin has a slope equal to q. One such 
ray represents the MC=AC locus whose slope equals the output level produced 
by each firm in the absence of taxation (QQ)• Points above (below) this 
locus represent larger (smaller) per-firm output levels where MOAC (MC<AC). 
From equation (III-3a), any ray from the origin must cut the P=MC locus 
from below, which implies that it is concave from below. Similarly, points 
above (below) the P-MC locus represent Q,n combinations where P >MC (P<MC). 
The initial long-run competitive equilibrium is, therefore, represented by 
point w. What then is the impact of excise and license taxation on this 
equilibrium? 
From equations (III-l) and (III-2), the tax-inclusive long-run 
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equilibrium must simultaneously satisfy^  
(III-5) P = MC+t and (III-6) MC = AC + ^  . 
Equations (III-5) and (III-6) define two tax-inclusive loci corresponding 
to the loci defined by equations (III-3) and (III-4). Essentially, the 
P=MC and MC=AC loci represent a special case of the tax inclusive loci 
(i.e., when t=L=0). Taxation simply shifts these loci and their new inter­
section determines the new tax-inclusive long-run equilibrium. First, con­
sider excise taxation (i.e., t>0, L=0). From (III-6), the new equilibrium 
must lie on the MC=AC locus. That is, excise taxes do not affect output 
per-firm. However, from (III-5), an excise tax pivots the P=MC locus in­
ward to P=MC+t, so that a new equilibrium is established at point d where 
both Q and n are reduced. Consequently, as t is increased over the full 
range of potential rates, the industry adjusts along the MC=AC locus from 
point w to point 0. Similarly, excise subsidies move the industry to points 
northwest of point w along the MC=AC locus. The most notable characteris­
tic of excise taxes is that they do not distort firms' production efficien­
cy. Those firms that remain in the new long-run equilibrium continue to 
produce at minimum per-unit cost (i.e., where MC=AC). Next, consider li­
cense fees (i.e., L>0, t=0). A license fee is perceived as an addition to 
fixed cost and, therefore, increases average cost (to AC 4- , but does not 
affect marginal cost. The P=MC locus is unaffected by the license fee, 
while the MC=AC locus pivots upward to MC=AC + as L is increased. The 
1^ 
new license-inclusive equilibrium is illustrated by point b which repre­
sents a larger output per-firm (q^ ), a lower sales level, and a smaller 
E^quation (III-6) is obtained by dividing equation (III-l) by q, then 
substituting equation (III-5) for P into equation (III-l). 
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number of firms. Essentially, as L is increased, output per-firm and, 
thus, MC must increase, until MC equals the (now larger) license-inclusive 
average cost. License fees, therefore, move the industry along the P=MC 
locus to points southwest of point w, while license subsidies move the in­
dustry to points northeast of point w. In contrast to excise taxes, li­
censes encourage firms to expand production to inefficiently large output 
levels. 
Finally, the adjustment of the industry to simultaneous use of both 
taxes can be illustrated. Once a license fee is levied, an excise tax can 
only move the industry along the MC=AC + ^  locus. Similarly, if an excise 
tax is levied, licenses can only move the industry along the P=MC+t locus. 
Use of either tax, therefore, defines the locus along which the industry 
can be moved by the other tax instrument. As a specific example, consider 
a dual licensing-excise scheme. An individual firm is represented in Fig­
ure III-2. 
P MC+t 
AC+t+ — 
P 
P 
P 0 
2 
1 
Figure III-2. The impact of a dual licensing-excise scheme 
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Point w (Figure III-l) and w' (Figure III-2) represent the initial 
long-run equilibrium in the absence of taxation. That is, n^  firms pro­
duce qg units at minimum per-unit cost. A unit excise tax, t, shifts both 
the AC and MC curves upward to AC+t and MC+t, respectively. The new long-
run equilibrium occurs at point d'. Remaining firms continue to produce 
qg units and price rises by the full amount of the excise (to P^ ). The 
corresponding industry adjustment is illustrated in Figure III-l by the 
movement from point w to point along the MC=AC locus. If a license fee is 
also levied, the average cost curve is shifted up along the marginal cost 
schedule to AC +t + -^  . Remaining firms minimize per-unit cost by expand­
ing output to q^  where a new equilibrium is established at point e'. The 
corresponding industry adjustment is represented by the move from point d 
to point e along the P=MC+t locus in Figure III-l. 
The Optimal Taxation Path 
We now proceed to characterize the optimal taxation path for a per­
fectly competitive industry. The problem is to determine that taxation 
scheme which maximizes social welfare from the industry given any required 
collections level. 
In the last chapter (see equation II-9a), it was shown that the con­
sumer surplus or total social welfare attributable to the consumption of 
this industry's good is 
(III-7) B = /%(k)dk - nc , 
assuming any tax collections are rebated in a lump-sum fashion. The first 
term is the area under the demand schedule (i.e., gross consumer benefits) 
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and the second term represents total industry cost (i.e., the number of 
firms times the cost per-firm). Welfare (B) is defined in terms of two 
variables, Q and n. Assigning a specific value to B (e.g., BQ) defines an 
iso-welfare surface which consists of the locus of Q,n combinations, such 
that B = BQ. Setting the total differential of equation (III-7) equal to 
zero yields the slope of this surface or 
(III-7a)  ^= q(AC-MC) 
B " 
One such iso-welfare surface (B = Bg) is illustrated in Figure III-3 where 
the P=MC and MC=AC loci discussed in the last section are also reproduced. 
Q 
AC=MC 
P=MC 
0 
Figure III-3. An iso-welfare surface 
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From equation (III-7a), the slope of an iso-welfare surface is zero along 
the AC =MC locus and infinity along the P -MC locus. Therefore, each sur­
face is represented by .a quasi-ellipse. Point w illustrates the uncon­
strained welfare optimum Q,n combination. Such an optimum satisfies the 
first order conditions for a maximum of B, or from equation (III-7) 
(III-8) U = P-MC = 0 
and (III-9) = q(AC-MC) = 0. 
dXX 
Higher (lower) levels of welfare are represented by surfaces which lie 
closer to (farther from) point W. The problem then is to move the industry 
(via taxation) onto the highest welfare surface consistent with any given 
collections constraint, RQ. 
Total collections consist of the sum of excise and license collec­
tions. That is, 
(III-10) R = tQ + nL. 
Since there is free exit and entry in the long-run, the net supply price 
is always driven to equality with net per-unit cost. Consequently, collec­
tions can also be expressed as the difference between the gross demand and 
net supply prices times the industry sales level. That is, 
(III-ll) R = P(Q)Q - nc , 
which is equal to the gross-of-tax industry profit. A given collections 
constraint shows all Q,n combinations which yield the same level of col­
lections (say R =RQ)• Its slope is found by setting the total differential 
of equation (III-ll) equal to zero, or 
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= q(AC-MC) 
(Ill-lla)  ^ MR-MC 
4*|R 
where MR is the gross industry marginal revenue (P + P'Q). From equation 
(III-ll), collections are maximized when 
(III-12) -^  = P + P'Q-MC = MR-MC = 0 
and (III-13) II = q(AC-MC) = 0. 
Equation (III-13) is satisfied by any Q,n combination on the AC=MC locus. 
Total differentiation of equation (III-12) yields the slope of the MR=MC 
locus, or 
(III-12a) 
MR=MC 
-c"q > 0 
(2P'+P"Q)n-c" < q ' 
This locus is positively-sloped and must lie below the P=MC locus, since 
P>MR at any poistive Q,n combination. Similar to the P=MC locus, the MR=MC 
locus is also concave from below. That is, equation (III-12a) shows that 
any ray originating from the origin has a greater slope (equal to q) than 
the MR=MC locus at the point of their intersection. These three loci and 
a given collections constraint (R=RQ) are illustrated in Figure III-4. 
Examination of equation (Ill-lla) shows that a particular collections con­
straint is represented by a quasi-ellipse similar to an iso-welfare surface. 
Its slope is zero along the MC=AC locus and infinity along the MR=MC locus. 
Point T represents the Q,n combination which maximizes collections. Note 
that collections are maximized at a Q,n combination such that Industry MR 
equals industry MC. This is exactly the Q,n combination which a multi-
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Q. 
AC=MC 
0 
\ 
P=MC 
y 
m=MC 
n 
Figure III-4. The optimal taxation path 
plant monopolist would choose in the absence of taxation. That is, the 
taxing authority essentially induces the industry to act as would a monopo­
list when it desires to maximize collections. Similar to iso-welfare sur­
faces, higher (lower) collection levels are represented by constraints 
which lie closer to (farther from) point T. 
The optimal taxation path can now be derived. For any given collec­
tions constraint, the industry must be moved to the highest attainable iso-
welfare surface consistent with the constraint. One such optimal taxation 
point is represented by point z in Figure III-4, For the collections level 
RQ, the highest attainable welfare level is BQ, since at point z the iso-
welfare surface is tangent to the collections constraint. The entire opti­
mal taxation path can be derived by changing the collections constraint 
and finding a new point of tangency to the highest obtainable iso-welfare 
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surface. Formally, a point on the optimal taxation path is defined by the 
Q,n combination which maximizes 
(III-14) / =y\(k)dk - nc(^ ) + X[Rq - P(Q)Q + nc^ ] . 
All such points can be determined by changing the value of R and remaximiz-
ing. Thus, each Q,n combination on the optimal taxation path must simul­
taneously satisfy 
(III-14a) = P - MC - X(MR-MC) = 0 
dtj 
and (III-14b) |^  = q(AC-MC)(1+X) = 0 
and (III-14c) -^  = Rg - P(Q)Q + nc = 0 
for the corresponding collections level. From equation (III-14a), 
X = . Therefore, X cannot equal -1, since that would require P=MR 
which only occurs if Q=0. Consequently, given X  ^-1, equation (III-14b) 
is only satisfied when AC =MC. That is, the optimal taxation path consists 
of all Q,n combinations which lie on the AC =MC locus on or to the north­
east of point T. This can also be shown by examining Figure III-4. Both 
the iso-welfare surface and the collecting constraint have a zero slope at 
all points on the AC =MC locus. Therefore, they are tangent at all points 
along this locus. Note that points on this locus between point 0 and point 
T cannot be optimal. At any point between points 0 and T, a higher iso-
welfare surface for the same collections level can be obtained by moving 
the industry to a point between points T and w. 
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In general, optimal taxation in perfectly competitive markets requires 
that output per-firm remain unaltered. As collections are increased, both 
the level of industry sales and the number of firms must be reduced by an 
equal proportion so that firms maintain their productive efficiency. 
Optimal Taxation Schemes 
We can now determine which of the taxation schemes discussed earlier 
meet the requirements of an optimal taxation scheme. Recall that excise 
taxes move the industry along the AC=MC locus, while license fees result in 
industry adjustment along the P=MC locus. Therefore, the industry adjust­
ment path under excise taxation coincides with the optimal path. This is 
illustrated in Figure III-5. The segment WT of the excise taxation path 
coincides with the optimal taxation path. However, license fees move the 
industry off the AC=MC locus and are, therefore, suboptimal tax instruments 
in perfectly competitive industries. Due to their equivalent effects, 
either unit or ad valorem excise taxes can move the industry along the 
optimal path. Essentially, optimal taxation requires that firms' produc­
tion efficiency not be distorted. While license fees induce firms to ex­
pand production and incur higher per-unit cost, excise taxes maintain pro­
duction efficiency at minimum average cost. Therefore, a single excise 
tax is all that is required for optimal taxation and licenses are inappro­
priate in perfectly competitive industries. 
Not only are licenses inefficient, but their revenue potential is 
also less than excise taxes. The collections functions for excise (R^ ) 
and license taxation (R^ ) are illustrated in Figure III-6. In the absence 
of taxation, the industry operates at point w where P=MC and profits are 
AC=MC 
P=MC 
MR=MC 
R=0 
n 
Figure III-5. Optimal taxation schemes Figure III-6. License and excise 
collection functions 
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zero (i.e., R = 0). Note that the R=0 locus must go through the origin. 
When both Q and n are zero, there is no tax base and collections must 
necessarily equal zero. Excise taxes move the industry along the AC=MC 
locus and collections increase from zero at point w to a maximum at point 
T. Excise taxation beyond point T moves the industry into the "prohibitive 
range" along its collections function. As license fees are increased, the 
industry moves away from point w along the P=MC locus. Collections are in­
creased from zero at point w to a maximum at point M where the collections 
constraint, Rm, is just tangent to the P=MC locus. For larger license 
fees, the industry is moved to the southwest of point M and collections 
are reduced. As Figure III-6 illustrates, for any industry sales level, 
excise collections always exceed license collections. For example, when 
Q=Qm, license collections equal Rm, which is less than the excise collec­
tions constraint going through point s (not drawn) at the same sales level. 
Intuitively, licenses induce firms to adopt inefficient production levels 
and, therefore, part of potential tax collections (realized by excise 
taxes) is forfeited to higher production cost. 
In general, excise taxation is required for optimal taxation of per­
fectly competitive industries. While multiple excise schemes can move the 
industry along its optimal path, the simplest method is a single excise 
tax. Moreover, licenses generally should not be used. They move the in­
dustry away from its optimal path and have a smaller revenue potential than 
excise taxes. 
Most analyses concerned with optimal commodity taxation have been 
limited to taxation of perfectly competitive markets. Because of the 
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superiority of excise taxation, the major issue has been whether a uni­
form or a differential "excise" rate structure among industries is re­
quired. Therefore, there has been very little analysis of whether other 
tax instruments or a multiple taxation scheme may be required. It will be 
shown in ensuing chapters that this superiority of excise taxation is not a 
general result, but, rather, is specific to perfectly competitive indus­
tries. When one allows for imperfect competition, optimal taxation gener­
ally requires a wider range of tax instruments and the use of multiple 
taxation schemes. 
The General Equilibrium Problem 
In this chapter, a partial equilibrium approach was used to derive the 
optimal taxation scheme for a single competitive industry. How do the 
results of this chapter relate to the general equilibrium problem discussed 
in Chapter II? 
From equation (III-14a), it was shown that optimal taxation requires 
X = . The value of X at all points along this industry's optimal 
taxation path (i.e., for every potential value of R) can be illustrated by 
examining Figure III-5. X is zero at point w (since P=MC) and decreases 
continually along the segment WT approaching -<» as point T is reached and 
collections from the industry are maximized (i.e., when MR=MC). Recall 
that optimal taxation of the economy requires equality of Xs for all indus­
tries simultaneously. In this chapter, we have derived that tax scheme 
which moves this particular industry along its optimal path. That is, we 
determined a tax scheme which can yield any value for X. Once this is com­
pleted for all industries, the general equilibrium optimal taxation problem 
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is easily solved by simply using these appropriate tax schemes, such that 
\ is equated across all industries. Consequently, while a partial equilib­
rium approach is used, it provides the necessary information to optimally 
tax the entire economy. 
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CHAPTER IV. MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
This chapter investigates the optimal taxation problem when the tax­
ing authority enters a monopolistically competitive industry. The charac^  
teristics of monopolistic competition differ greatly from those of perfect­
ly competitive markets. While perfectly competitive markets operate pareto 
efficiently in the absence of taxation, price exceeds marginal cost under 
monopolistic competition. In addition, monopolistically competitive firms 
each produce a distinct product and, therefore, consumers' valuations of 
their output depend on the level of variety (i.e., number of firms), in ad­
dition to the total quantity consumed. Finally, each firm faces a down­
ward-sloping demand schedule which results in production above minimum 
average cost in the long-run. Because of these differences, characteris­
tics of the optimal taxation path and optimal taxation schemes differ from 
those derived in perfectly competitive markets. 
In his famous work on monopolistic competition, Chamberlin [8] dis­
tinguished between two types of competitive behavior —that is, industries 
characterized with and without active price competition. Both types of 
competitive behavior are discussed in the next section. A mathematical 
model is developed and the long-run industry equilibrium conditions for 
both types of competitive behavior are derived. Next, characteristics of 
the optimal taxation path for any monopolistically competitive industry 
are examined. While the exact path depends on the specific values of the 
parameters in the model, the region within which the optimal path general­
ly lies is determined. Optimal taxation schemes are analyzed in the fol­
lowing section, both when the industry is characterized by price and 
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nonprice competition. Contrary to perfect competition, optimal taxation 
generally requires a combination of taxes. Finally, the last section gives 
an intuitive rationale for these results. 
Price and Nonprice Competition 
This section discusses the basic model which defines the long-run in­
dustry equilibrium position when the industry is characterized by either 
price or nonprice competitive behavior. The system of equations describ­
ing these equilibria will be used throughout the remaining sections of this 
chapter. 
Each firm in a monopolistically competitive industry produces a dif­
ferentiated product. Therefore, industry demand is a function of the level 
of variety available in addition to the quantity consumed. Let the indus­
try's inverse demand function be 
(IV-1) P = P(Q,n) 
where Q = nq is total industry output (assumed to be equal to the quantity 
demanded in the long-run equilibrium), n represents the number of firms 
(i.e., the level of variety) existing in the industry, and q is output per-
firm. The industry demand price is inversely related to Q, and n has a 
positive, but diminishing, impact on P. That is, assume PQ<0, Pqq _<0, 
P^  >0, and P^  ^<0. Finally, assume that the responsiveness of P to changes 
in Q diminishes as n increases, or P^  ^>0. A specific demand function 
which displays these properties is 
(IV-2) P = A - Q l^ b + where A, a, and b >0 and a >b. 
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This describes a linear demand function in P,Q space which pivots upward 
about its vertical intercept (A) as n is increased. 
Since all firms are assumed to face identical demand and cost func^ -
tions, a single industry price exists at all times. However, individual 
firms do not respond to equation (IV^ 2), but, rather, base output decisions 
on what they perceive to be the demand function they face. Equation (IV-2) 
can be manipulated to express the price faced by the i*-^  firm (P^ ) as a 
function of its output and the remaining firms' output levels, or 
n=l 
(IV-3) P. = A -aq -b Z q. . 
i=l  ^
If the industry is characterized by price competition, then each firm i 
3qi 
assumes = 0, and, therefore, the slope of its "perceived" demand func-
9Pi 
tion is -— = -a. However, since all firms' output levels move together, 
each actually faces the following "proportional" demand function (derived 
from equation (IV-3) by letting q^  = q^ ), 
(IV-4) P^  = A-q^  [b(n-l)+a] . 
Inspection of equations (IV-3) and (IV-4) show that the absolute slope of 
the proportional demand function is greater than that of the perceived de­
mand function. This results in active price competition. Each firm be­
lieves it can lower price and increase sales without reactions by rivals. 
That is, all believe they can expand their sales with a small reduction in 
price by moving down their perceived demand functions. However, since all 
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firms expand output simultaneously, all actually move down their true or 
proportional demand schedule (i.e., the perceived demand curve slides along 
the proportional demand schedule) and realize a smaller increase in sales 
at a lower price than expected a priori. 
Active price competition breaks down when firms correctly realize 
their mutual interdependence. That is, nonprice competition exists when 
each firm correctly realizes that it faces the proportional demand func­
tion. In this case, firms realize that price cutting is met by rivals so 
that all are worse off as they are forced to move down their proportional 
demand schedules. A "live and let live" outlook, tacit agreements, and/or 
open price associations may result and lead to the absence of active price 
competition. Despite this behavior, entry or exit occurs until economic 
profits are zero in the long-run. Therefore, the perceived demand function 
plays no role and nonprice competitors base output decisions only on their 
proportional demand function. 
The slopes of the industry, proportional, and perceived demand func­
tions can be derived from equations (IV-2), (IV-4), and (IV-3), respective­
ly. That is. 
and 
(IV-2a) "IQ ~ ~ PQ, for the industry demand, 
9P ^ p n n bT 
(IV-4a) = - |^ b(n-l)+aj = -n j^ b + = P^ n, for the propor­
tional demand. 
and 
= -a = Pq, for the perceived demand 
Therefore, P^ n < P^  < P^  < 0 
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We will assume that each firm faces a falling long-run average cost 
structure (AC) of the form^  
(IV-5) AC = c + ^  , 
where c represents a constant marginal cost and F is total fixed cost per 
firm. Free entry in the long-run ensures long-run economic profits (TT) 
are zero, or 
(IV-6) IT = P(Q,n)q - cq - F = 0, 
and each firm maximizes its profit by equating its perceived marginal reve­
nue to marginal cost. That is 
(IV-6a) ir' = P + PqQ -c = 0 for nonprice competition, 
and (IV-6b) ir' = P + P^ q -c = 0 for price competition. 
The long-run industry equilibrium is then defined by equations (IV-6) and 
(IV-6a) for nonprice competition and by equations (IV-6) and (IV-6b) when 
the industry is characterized by price competition. These two equilibria 
are illustrated in Figure IV-1. The price competitive long-run equilibrium 
is represented by point Ep, where the perceived demand schedule (dd) inter­
sects the proportional demand (DDp) and is tangent to AC. When nonprice 
competition characterizes the industry, long-run equilibrium occurs at 
point where the proportional demand schedule (DD^ ) is tangent to AC. As 
Figure IV-1 illustrates, price competitors produce a larger output at a 
lower per-unit cost in the long-run. 
S^ince all the relevant equilibria occur where firms' average cost is 
falling, the results are not significantly changed by assuming instead a 
U-shaped average cost schedule. 
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Figure IV-1. Price and nonprice equilibria 
Optimal taxation schemes will be analyzed for both types of market 
equilibria. Our next task, however, is to derive the optimal taxation 
path for a monopolistically competitive industry irrespective of the type 
of competitive behavior which exists in the industry. 
The Optimal Taxation Path 
Let social welfare from the industry (with taxes rebated in a lump-sum 
fashion) be defined by 
rQ 
(IV-7) B =/ P(k,n)dk - cQ - nF, 
0^ 
which consists of gross consumer benefits (which now depend on the level of 
variety, n, in addition to the quantity consumed) minus total industry 
cost. Since economic profits are dissipated in the long-run by free entry. 
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tax collections are equal to gross (of tax) industry profits, or 
(IV-8) R = P(Q,n)Q - cQ - nF. 
The optimal taxation path is defined by the locus of Q,n combinations which 
maximize B for all potential values of R. Formally, it is represented by 
moving the industry to the highest attainable iso-welfare surface consis­
tent with any given collections constraint. 
First, consider the collections constraint. From equation (IV-8), 
collections are maximized when 
(IV-9) II = P + PQQ -c = MR(Q) -MC(Q) = 0 
and (IV-10) ^  = P Q -F = MR(n) -MC(n) = 0 
on n 
are simultaneously satisfied. These equations define two loci whose inter­
section represents the Q,n combination required for maximal collections. 
Setting the total differential of equation (IV-10) equal to zero yields 
the slope of the MR(n) = MC(n) locus, or 
• ... 
MR(n) =MC(n) nn 
(IV-lOa) 
This locus represents all Q,n combinations, such that the marginal revenue 
of another firm (MR(n) = P^ Q) equals its marginal cost (MC(n) = F). The 
slope of this locus is positive, and with the specific demand function de­
fined by equation (IV-2), its slope can be shown to equal 1/q. This locus 
is illustrated in Figure IV-2 and is simply a ray originating from the 
origin. That is, there is only one output level per-firm, such that MR(n) 
= MC (n). 
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MR(Q)=MC(Q) 
MR(n)=MC(n) 
[Slope = 1/q^ ] 
Figure IV-2. Collection constraints 
Next, consider the MR(Q) = MC(Q) locus, which represents all Q,n combina­
tions such that the marginal revenue of an additional Q (MR(Q) = P+P^ Q) 
equals its marginal cost (MC(Q) = c). From equations (IV-9) and (IV-2), 
its slope is found to be 
(IV-9a) dn dQ 
= " , b(n-l)+a 
MR(Q)=MC(Q) ^ n"^ Q^n^  (a-b)q 
> 1/q, 
which is positive and cuts any ray originating from the origin (whose slope 
equals 1/q) from below. Thus, the MR(Q)=MC(Q) locus originates from the 
origin and is concave from above, as illustrated in Figure IV-2. The point 
of maximal collections is represented by point T. Essentially, this is the 
point at which a multi-plant monopolist would operate so as to maximize its 
profits. Therefore, if the government were to maximize collections, it 
would induce the industry to act like a multi-plant monopolist. A given 
collections constraint is defined by equation (IV-8) by letting R = R^ . 
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The slope of this constraint is 
-(p+PgQ-c) -[MR(Q) -MC(Q)] 
(IV-ll)  ^
n^Q -F 
Note that :MR(n)-MC(n) > 0 (£0) at all Q,n combinations below (above or on) 
the MR(n)=MC(n) locus and MR(Q)-MC(Q) > 0 (^ 0) at all Q,n combinations 
above (below or on) the MR(Q)=MC(Q) locus. Consequently, collection con­
straints are illustrated in Figure IV-2 as quasi-elipses drawn around the 
(Q,n) point of maximal collections. Constraints which lie closer to point 
T represent higher collection levels (i.e., > Rg > R = 0). Note that 
the R=0 constraint originates form the origin. When Q and n are both zero, 
there is no tax base; thus, collections must equal zero. The problem, 
then, is to choose the point on each constraint which yields the highest 
level of social welfare from the industry. Thus, to complete the analysis, 
we need to examine the welfare surface. 
From equation (IV-7), social welfare from the industry is maximized 
when 
(IV-12) = P-c = P-MC(Q) = 0 
dll  
'Q 
and (IV-13) — =/ P (k,n)dk-F = MB(n)-MC(n) = 0 
are simultaneously satisfied. These equations define two loci whose inter­
section represents the Q,n combination which maximizes social welfare from 
the industry. The P = MC(Q) locus shows all Q,n combinations such that 
the marginal gross benefit (P) of an additional Q equals its marginal cost 
(MC(Q) = c). Similarly, the MB(n)=MC(n) locus shows all Q,n combinations 
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such that the marginal gross benefit MB(n) 
'fS (k,n)dk of an additional 
firm equals its marginal cost (MC(n) = F). These loci are illustrated 
in Figure IV-3. 
P=MC(Q) 
MB(n)=MC(n) 
[Slope = 1/q^ ] 
Figure IV-3. Iso-welfare surfaces 
From equation (IV-13), the slope of the MB(n)=MC(n) loci can be shown 
to equal 
(IV-13a) dn dQ 
-P 
MC(n)=MC(n) n^n 
> 0 where w = f  
nn ^ 0 
P^ (^k,n)dk. 
Using the specific demand function defined by equation (IV-2), its slope 
can be shown to equal 1/q, which is simply a ray originating from the 
origin. Similarly using equation (IV-12), the slope of the P-MC(Q) loci is 
equal to 
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(IV-12b)  ^  ^>0 in general, and is equal to 
 ^P=MC(Q) n 
given the specific demand function defined by equation (IV-2). Therefore, 
any ray through the origin (whose slope equals 1/q) must cut the P=MC(Q) 
locus from above, which implies that the P=MC(Q) locus is concave from 
above. Welfare is maximized at the Q,n combination corresponding to point 
w where the two loci intersect and equations (IV-12) and (IV-13) are both 
satisfied. Iso-welfare surfaces are defined by all Q,n combinations which 
yield a given value of B (e.g., B=BQ) in equation (IV-7). From equation 
(IV-7), these surfaces have a slope equal to 
Therefore, iso-welfare surfaces are represented by quasi-ellipse (with 
slope of zero where P=MC(Q) and infinite slope where MB(n)=MC(n)) drawn 
around point w, with successively higher welfare levels represented by sur­
faces which lie closer to point w (i.e., >B^  
We can now proceed to specify how the optimal taxation path is de­
termined. For any given collections constraint, a point on the optimal 
path is represented by the highest attainable iso-welfare surface consis­
tent with the constraint. That is, the point of tangency between the col­
lections constraint and an iso-welfare surface; the optimal tax path is 
then a locus of such points. First, we need to determine where the loci in 
(IV-14) MB(n)-MC(n) * 
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Figure IV-2 lie relative to those in Figure IV-3. Consider the R=0 collec­
tions locus in Figure IV-2. This locus consists of all Q,n combinations 
such that P = c + -^  = AC, Therefore, the P = MC(Q) (or P=c) locus in 
Figure IV-3 must lie below the R=0 locus since MC(Q) = c < AC(Q) = c + ^. 
That is, at any point on the R=0 locus, P=AC>c. Thus, at any given n, Q 
must be increased to satisfy the P=c locus. Next, consider the MB(n)=MC(n) 
(or and the MR(n)=MC(n) (or P^ Q=F) loci. Utilizing equation (IV-2), 
it can be shown that 
(IV-15) w = and (IV-16) P Q = . 
" 2n^  n^  
Note that, for any given Q, the n which equates P^ Q=F is greater than the 
n which satisfies w =F. Therefore, the w =F (or MB(n)=MC(n)) locus must 
n n 
lie below the P^ Q=F (or MR(n)=MC(n)) locus. These four loci are illus­
trated in Figure IV-4. 
n P=MC(Q) 
.MR(n)=MC(n) 
R=0 
îffi(n)=MC(n) 
Figure IV-4. The optimal taxation path 
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Note that point w lies outside the zero collections constraint (i.e., 
the R=0 locus). Intuitively, marginal cost pricing is required to maximize 
welfare. Since marginal cost is less than average cost, firms require a 
net subsidy (i.e., R <0) to operate efficiently. If collections are con­
strained to zero, the optimal Q,n combination is that represented by point 
z. For the given level of collections (R=0), point z represents the par­
ticular Q,n combination which moves the industry to the highest attainable 
iso-welfare surface (B^ ) consistent with the R=0 collections constraint. 
The remaining Q,n combinations on the optimal taxation path can be deter­
mined by changing the collections constraint and finding points of tangency 
to the highest attainable iso-welfare surface. Formally, points on the op­
timal taxation path are found by maximizing B subject to R=R. That is, the 
maximum of 
P(k,n)dk -cQ -nF + X [r -P(Q,n)Q +cQ +nFJ 
A 
must satisfy 
(IV-17a) -^  = P - MC(Q) - X(MR(Q)-MC(Q)) = 0, 
(IV-17b) MB(n)-MC(n) - x(MR(n)-MC(n)) = 0, 
(IV-17c) -^  = R - P(Q,n)Q +cQ +nF = 0 
O A 
simultaneously. Although the particular shape of the otplmal taxation path 
depends on the specific model parameters, the region in which the optimal 
path can exist can be determined. First, assume X <0, so that the industry 
never operates on the pareto-inferior side of the tax collections (Laffer) 
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function or on the pareto-inferior side of the welfare function. Then, 
equation (IV-17a) is only satisfied if P-MC(.Q) and MR(Q)-MC(Q) are of oppo­
site signs. Points below the P=MC(Q) locus represent Q,n combinations such 
that P-MC(Q) and MR(Q)-MC(Q) are both negative. Similarly, at all points 
above the MR(Q)=MC(Q) locus, both P-MC(Q) and MR(Q)-MC(Q) are positive. 
Consequently, the optimal taxation path cannot lie in these regions, since 
condition (IV-17a) is violated. Intuitively, in either of these regions, 
there exists a marginal adjustment to Q which would simultaneously increase 
both welfare and collections. That is, the optimal path must lie between 
these two loci where MR(Q)-MC(Q) < 0 and P-MC(Q) > 0, so that changing Q 
results in a tradeoff between collections and welfare. The feasible re­
gion of the optimal taxation path can be limited further by examining equa­
tion (IV-17b). Since X <0, MB(n)-MC(n) and MR(n)-MC(n) must be of opposite 
signs for this equation to be satisfied. This eliminates any Q,n combina­
tions above the MR(n)=MC(n) locus (since both MR(n)-MC(n) and MB(n)-MC(n) 
are positive in this region) and the region below the MB(n)=MC(n) locus 
(since both MR(n)-MC(n) and (MB(n)-MC(n) are negative in this region). 
Therefore, condition (IV-17b) requires the optimal path to lie between 
these two loci (where MR(n)-MC(n) > 0 and MB(n)-MC(n) < 0). Consequently, 
the entire feasible region for the optimal taxation path is represented by 
Q,n combinations which lie inside the UTVW region illustrated in Figure 
IV-4. 
As the industry is moved along its optimal path from point w to point 
T, the movements in Q and n depend on specific values of parameters and 
are not determinant for the general case. However, output per firm, q, 
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must fall as one moves along the path toward maximal collections. This 
could be satisfied by both Q and n increasing, both decreasing, or by Q 
falling and n increasing. The latter two possibilities seem intuitively 
reasonable. Increased collections may require a reduction of both the 
level of variety and the level of industry sales. Alternatively, the 
necessary reduction in industry sales may be (optimally) partially offset 
by promoting a greater variety level. However, the first possibility 
seems rather surprising. The shaded portion of the feasible optimal taxa­
tion region (region UXT) illustrates this surprising possibility that opti­
mal taxation may require both the level of industry sales and the level of 
variety to be increased as collections are increased. That is, the welfare 
optimum may have a smaller sales level with less variety than exists when 
collections are maximized. This is possible because, even though Q and n 
are both less at the welfare maximum than at the tax maximum, q is larger 
and, therefore, firms are producing at lower per-unit cost. Consequently, 
if variety is of little importance to consumers, they may prefer being able 
to consume fewer goods with less variety at a lower price. This would re­
sult if product differentiation were mainly cosmetic and there were sub­
stantial economies of scale to be gained by firms operating in the indus­
try. 
Optimal Taxation Schemes 
In this section, we derive those tax instruments required to optimally 
tax monopolistically competitive industries. In general, at least two 
taxes are needed to move monopolistically competitive industries to and 
along their optimal taxation paths. Optimal taxation schemes are derived 
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for both types of industry behavior (i.e., with and without price compe­
tition) . 
Nonprlce competition 
First, consider the case where the industry is characterized by the 
absence of active price competition. Using equations (IV-6) and (IV-6a), 
and assuming all three tax instruments are levied, the long-run industry 
equilibrium is defined by 
(IV-18a) ÏÏ = P(Q,n)q(l-s) - cq -tq -F -L = 0 
and (IV-18b) TT' = (P+P^ Q)(l-s) -c -t = MR(Q) (1-s) -MC(Q) -t = 0. 
Equation (IV-18) defines a system of two equations in three unknowns (Q, n, 
and q). This system is made solvable by recalling that (IV-18c) Q =nq. 
The impact that each tax has on output per firm is determined by total dif­
ferentiation of equation (IV-18), or 
Pqq(i-s) -PqQ(l-s) P^q(i-s) dQ 
(2PQ+PqQQ)(i-s) 0 dq 
1 -n -q dn 
Pqds + qdt + dL 
(P+PqQ)ds + dt 
0 
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Then, using the specific demand function defined in equation (IV-2) and ap­
plying Cramer's rule yields: 
Each of the three tax instruments result in larger output per-firm in the 
long-run. Intuitively, excise taxes reduce the absolute slope of the net-
of-tax demand by reducing the number of firms and pivoting the proportional 
demand function upward, thereby inducing firms to move down their average 
cost schedule. License fees increase the gross (of tax) average cost and 
encourage firms to spread the fixed fee over a larger number of units. 
We can now determine the adjustment path of the industry for each form 
of taxation. A portion of Figure IV-4 is reproduced in Figure IV-5 to aid 
this analysis. In the absence of taxation, the industry must be located 
at point N where profits equal zero (i.e., R=0) and each firm is maximizing 
profits (i.e., MR(Q) = MC(Q)) (from equations (IV-6) and (IV-6a) defining 
the no-tax long-run industry equilibrium). 
-P, 
(IV-19b) 
-(PPn -P p.) 
(IV-19c) 
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n MR(Q)=MC(Q) 
'MR(n)=MC(n) 
MB(n)=MC(n) 
0 Q 
Figure IV-5. Optimal taxation schemes; nonprice competition 
Recall that the optimal taxation path lies in the UTVW region. There­
fore, we want to find that tax or combination of taxes which move the in­
dustry from point N to points inside this region. As taxes are imposed and 
collections are increased, the industry is moved to collection constraints 
which lie closer to the point of maximum collections (point T). That is, 
for any set of taxes, the resulting new equilibrium will lie on a collec­
tions constraint inside the R=0 locus. Specifically, it will be that par­
ticular collections constraint which keeps net (of tax) industry profits 
equal to zero or satisfies equation (IV-18a). The particular Q,n combina­
tion (on this new collections constraint) representing the new equilibrium 
will be that which simultaneously satisfies both equations (IV-18a) and 
(IV-18b). That is, a new tax-inclusive industry equilibrium is represented 
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by the intersection of the new (higher level) collection constraint and the 
MR(Q)(l-s)=MG(Q)+t locus. 
First, consider single unit excise taxes. As excise rates are in­
creased, the industry is moved to collection constraints which lie inside 
the R=0 locus. From equation (IV-I8b), the industry is also moved to a 
Q,n combination which satisfies the MR(Q)=MC(Q)+t locus. This locus must 
lie above the MR(Q) =MC(Q) locus, since at any point on the MR(Q)=MC(Q) 
locus, MR(Q) <MC(Q)+t. Consequently, MR(Q) must be increased by reducing 
Q or increasing n such that MR(Q) =MC(Q)+t. Therefore, the new equilibrium 
must lie at Q,n combinations above the MR(Q)=MC(Q) locus. Moreover, the 
new equilibrium point must also lie below the l/q^  ray. Recall that q^  ^
represents output per-firm in the absence of taxation. Since excise taxes 
increase output per-firm (from equation (IV-19b)), the ray originating from 
the origin and intersecting the new equilibrium point must lie below the 
initial l/q^  ray. Therefore, the adjustment path of the industry to unit 
excise taxes must lie in the shaded region (in Figure IV-5) to points 
southwest of point N. Similarly, unit excise subsidies move the industry 
to points in the shaded region to the northwest of point N. Essentially, 
unit excise tax equilibria are determined by the intersection of the MR(Q)= 
MC(Q)+t locus and the 1/q^  ray (where q^  represents output per-firm under 
unit excise taxation). First, note that there is no single unit excise 
rate which can raise maximal potential collections from the industry (i.e., 
no excise rate can move the industry to point T). Moreover, the adjustment 
path of the industry to unit excise taxation lies entirely outside the 
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optimal taxation region. Therefore, single unit excise taxes are not a 
maximal nor an optimal taxation scheme. 
Next, consider single ad valorem excise taxes. The adjustment path of 
the industry to ad valorem excise taxes lies in the same regions (tut not 
necessarily on the same path) as under unit excise taxation. Similarly, 
ad valorem tax equilibria are represented by the intersection of the 
MR(Q)(1-s) =MC(Q) locus and the l/q^  ray (where represents the output 
level per-firm with ad valorem taxes). From equation (IV-19c), the l/q^  
ray must lie below the l/q^  ray for any positive ad valorem rate. At any 
point on the MR(Q)=MC(Q) locus, MR(Q)(l-s) <MC(Q) (given s >0). Therefore, 
the latter locus must lie above the former locus for any positive ad 
valorem rates. This implies that ad valorem excise taxes (subsidies) move 
the industry to points in the shaded region to the southwest (northeast) 
of point N as do unit excise taxes (subsidies). Consequently, single ad 
valorem excise taxes cannot maximize collections nor optimally tax the in­
dustry. 
Finally, consider license fees. Examination of equation (IV-18b) 
shows that licenses do not affect this marginal condition. License equi­
libria, therefore, must lie on the MR(Q)=MC(Q) locus. From equation (IV-
19a), positive license fees increase the output level per-firm (q^ ). 
License equilibria are represented by the intersection of the MR(Q)=MC(Q) 
locus and the 1/q^  ray. Consequently, license fees (subsidies) move the 
industry along the MR(Q)=MC(Q) locus to points southwest (northeast) of 
point N. Contrary to excise taxes, licenses can move the industry to a 
point on the optimal taxation path. They can move the industry to the 
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point of maximal collections (point T), but this is the only point on the 
optimal taxation path that can be reached by license fees. 
With the exception of a single license fee which can maximize collec­
tions, there is no single tax capable of moving the industry to the optimal 
taxation path. Moreover, there is no single tax which can move the indus­
try along its optimal path. Use of single taxes in markets characterized 
by nonprice monopolistic competition are, therefore, generally inappro­
priate. One can do better with a multiple taxation scheme. Figure IV-5 
illustrates that there are three basic multiple taxation schemes which con­
stitute optimal schemes. First, a multiple license fee-excise subsidy 
scheme can move the industry to and along its optimal path. A license fee 
can move the industry from point N to points below point T along the MR(Q)= 
MC(Q) locus. Then, an excise subsidy can move the industry to points in­
side the optimal taxation region. Therefore, appropriate rates could move 
the industry along its optimal path as the collection constraint is in­
creased. Note that a multiple license subsidy-excise scheme cannot be op­
timal. A license subsidy moves the industry to points above point N along 
the MR(Q)=MC(Q) locus. From here, excise taxes (or subsidies) can only 
move the industry to points which lie totally outside the optimal taxation 
region. Consequently, a multiple licensing-excise scheme is only optimal 
if it consists of a license fee and an excise subsidy. Second, consider a 
multiple excise scheme. Use of both excise taxes can only be optimal if 
they are of opposite signs. That is, an excise tax (subsidy) moves the in­
dustry into the shaded region to points southwest (northeast) of point N, 
from which an ad valorem excise tax (subsidy) can only move the Industry 
57 
to points further southwest (northeast) in the same region. Clearly, two 
excise taxes (subsidies) cannot optimally tax the industry. However, a 
unit excise tax (subsidy) will move the industry to points southwest 
(northeast) of point N in the shaded region, from which an ad valorem sub­
sidy (tax) can move the industry into the optimal taxation region. Final­
ly, the appropriate rates of all three taxes can constitute an optimal 
taxation scheme. However, the appropriate use of any two taxes is suffi­
cient for optimal taxation. 
If the goal is to maximize collections, the simplest method is a 
single license fee. A multiple excise scheme consisting of a simultaneous 
tax and subsidy can also move the industry to point T. This requires 
sP +t >0 and sMR(Q) = t, so that MR(Q)(l-s) =MC(Q)+t coincides with MR(Q) = 
MC(Q). It is interesting that at least two taxes are generally required to 
optimally tax this industry, while only one tax (a license fee) is needed 
to maximize collections. 
Price competition 
If the industry is characterized by active price competition, then 
firms do not base output decisions on the true or industry marginal revenue 
schedule. That is, the MR(Q)=MC(Q) locus is no longer relevant in this 
case. Rather, each firm operates on the basis of its perceived marginal 
revenue schedule (MRp). Equations (IV-6) and (IV-6b) define the long-run 
price competitive industry equilibrium in the absence of taxation. The in­
dustry operates where profits are zero and where perceived marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost (i.e., where the R=0 locus intersects the MRp=MC(Q) 
locus). The MEp=MC(Q) locus is defined by equation (IV-6b) and its slope 
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is (assuming p is a constant) 
Using equation (IV-20), it can be shown that the slope of the MRp=MC(Q) 
locus exceeds 1/q (i.e., it is concave from above). Moreover, this locus 
must lie below the MR(Q)=MC(Q) locus since 
(IV-21) MR(Q) = P+PQQ < MRp = P+P^ q 
for any given Q,n combination. That is, condition (IV-21) is satisfied 
whenever P^ n <Pq, or whenever the absolute slope of the proportional demand 
exceeds the absolute slope of the perceived demand. In an earlier section, 
this condition was shown to hold. Also, note that P >MRp. Therefore, the 
MRp=MC(Q) locus lies between the MR(Q)=MC(Q) and P=MC(Q) loci, as illus­
trated in Figure IV-6. 
n 
0 
MR(n)=MC(n) 
MB(n)=MC(n) 
Q 
Figure IV-6<, Optimal taxation schemes: price competition 
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From equations (IV-6) and (IV-6b), long-run equilibrium in the ab­
sence of taxation is illustrated by point P. Although point P must lie to 
the right of point N (along the R=0 locus), its actual position depends on 
the specific values of parameters in industry demand and firms' costs. As 
drawn, it lies in the optimal taxation region (UTVW). However, it could 
lie outside this region along the R=0 locus between points Y and N. Let q^  
represent the output per-firm produced in the price competitive equilib­
rium. Note that qp > q^ , which is consistent with our earlier result that 
price competitors produce a larger output than nonprice competitors. 
From equations (IV-6) and (IV-6b), the tax inclusive long-run (price 
competitive) industry equilibrium is defined by 
(IV-22a) IT = P(Q,n)q(l-s) -cq -tq -F -L = 0 
and (IV-22b) ir' = (P+P^ q)(l-s) -c-t = MRp(l-s) -MC(Q) -t = 0. 
The impact of each separate tax on output per-firm is determined in the 
same manner as under nonprice competition. Total differentiation of equa­
tions (IV-22a), (IV-22b), and (IV-22c) Q-nq=0 (and assuming that P^  is con­
stant) yields, 
?Qq(l-s) -Pqq(l-s) 
PQ(I-S) 
n ' 
-n -q 
dQ 
dq = 
dn 
Pqds + qdt + dL 
MRpds + dt 
and, using Cramer's rule: 
(IV-23a) A. = =i > 0 dL 2P (l-s)q (IV-23b) 1^ =0, and 
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(IV-23C) 
Both license fees and ad valorem excise taxes encourage firms to expand 
production while unit excise taxes do not alter output per-firm (assuming 
a linear perceived demand). We can now derive the industry adjustment path 
for each type of taxation. As rates increase, the industry is moved to 
collection constraints which lie closer to point T. Tax equilibria are 
represented by the intersection of the MRp(l-s)=MC(Q)+t locus and the 1/q 
ray (where q represents the output level chosen by firms when taxes are im­
posed) . 
Unit excise taxes do not change output per-firm (by equation(IV-23b)), 
and, therefore, such tax inclusive equilibria must lie on the 1/qp ray. 
For any unit excise tax (subsidy), the MRp=MC(Q)+t locus lies above (below) 
the MRp=MC(Q) locus. Therefore, unit excise taxes move the industry from 
point P toward Point 0 and unit subsidies move the industry to points 
northeast of point P along the 1/qp ray. 
From equation (IV-23c), ad valorem excise taxes increase output per-
firm. Therefore, the industry adjustment path must lie below (above) the 
1/qp ray for ad valorem excise taxes (subsidies). For any ad valorem ex­
cise tax (subsidy), the MRp(l-s)=MC(Q) locus lies above (below) the MRp= 
MC(Q) locus. That is, ad valorem excise taxes (subsidies) move the indus­
try to points above (below) the MRp=MC(Q) locus. Consequently, the indus­
try adjustment path for ad valorem excise taxes (subsidies) must lie in the 
shaded region to the southwest (northeast) of point P in Figure IV-6—that 
is, below (above) the 1/qp ray and above (below) the MRp=MC(Q) locus. 
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Finally, consider the use of license fees. Licenses do not distort 
the equality between MRp=MC(Q) (from equation (IV-22b)). They do, however, 
increase output per-firm (q^ ) and pivot the 1/q^  ray below the 1/qp ray. 
Consequently, license fees (subsidies) move the industry along the MRp= 
MC(Q) locus to points southwest (northeast) of point P. In summary, unit 
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excises move the industry along the 1/qp ray, licenses move it along the 
=MC(Q) locus, and ad valorem excises move it to points between these 
two loci. 
Whether any single tax can move the industry to a point on the optimal 
taxation path depends on the position of the initial long-run equilibrium 
point (P). As drawn, point P lies in the optimal taxation region and 
could, therefore, constitute the optimal taxation point when R=0. How­
ever, point P could also lie outside the optimal region. Basically, there 
is nothing fundamental in the price competitive behavior of the industry 
which ensures that point P lies on the optimal path. First, note that part 
of the industry adjustment path to license fees does lie in the optimal 
region regardless of where point P is located. That is, a portion of the 
MRp=MC(Q) locus always intersects the optimal taxation region (UTVW). 
While license fees can move the industry to a particular point on the opti­
mal path (i.e., for a particular collections level), they cannot move the 
industry to all optimal taxation points. Excise taxation is very similar. 
As drawn, either excise tax can move the industry to a particular point 
on the optimal path, but are generally sub-optimal if used alone. More­
over, if point P lies above point Y, then unit excise taxes are never opti­
mal and ad valorem excises may lose the ability to move the industry to 
even a single point on the optimal path. 
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In contrast to nonprice competition, use of single taxes in price com­
petitive markets may optimally tax the industry for particular collection 
levels. However, as in nonprice competitive markets, generally at least 
two taxes are required to move a price competitive industry along its op­
timal path. Whether both need to be taxes, or one a tax and the other a 
subsidy, depends on the particular level of collections and on the location 
of point P. For example, consider a multiple unit excise-licensing scheme. 
Assume the objective was to maximize social welfare from the industry 
(i.e., move the industry to point w). This can be accomplished by a 
license fee which moves the industry to point x and a unit excise subsidy 
which (from point x) moves the industry to point w. Alternatively, assume 
the objective was to maximize collections (or move the industry to point T). 
This requires a license subsidy to move the industry from point P to point 
z and an excise tax which moves the industry from point z to point T. So­
cial welfare or tax collections could also be maximized via a multiple ex­
cise scheme. For example, an ad valorem excise tax could move the industry 
to a point on the MB(n)=MC(n) locus, from which a unit subsidy can move the 
industry to point w. Alternatively, an ad valorem subsidy can move the in­
dustry to the MR(N)=MC(n) locus from which collections can be maximized 
with a unit tax. Therefore, the actual sign of the various tax instruments 
depends on the specific point on the optimal taxation path to which the in­
dustry is moved relative to point P. 
Finally, a multiple taxation scheme is also generally required to 
maximize collections. Contrary to nonprice competition, a single license 
fee cannot maximize collections, since the MRp=NC(Q) locus does not 
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intersect point T. A single unit excise tax could maximize collections 
only if point P happened to coincide with point z and ad valorem excise 
taxation only has such potential if point P lies above point Y. Conse­
quently, when the industry is monopolistically (price) competitive, at 
least two taxes are generally required for both maximal and optimal taxa­
tion. 
Summary: Monopolistic Competition 
In general, a multiple taxation scheme is required either to maximize 
collections or to maximize net welfare given any collections level under 
conditions of monopolistic competition. However, a single excise tax can 
accomplish these goals in perfectly competitive markets. Why should these 
appropriate taxation schemes differ between perfectly and monopolistically 
competitive markets? In both types of industries, the social welfare from 
the industry and the collections function are completely defined by the 
level of industry sales and the number of firms in the industry. Alterna­
tively, since Q = nq, they are completely defined by the industry sales 
level and the output level of each firm. Intuitively, there are two tar­
gets (Q and q) which must be appropriately adjusted to satisfy the optimal 
taxation problem. In general, these two targets require two (tax) instru­
ments. That is, one instrument to adjust Q and one to adjust q to their 
appropriate levels. However, in perfectly competitive markets, output per-
firm is optimally adjusted in the absence of taxation. That is, each firm 
operates efficiently at minimum per-unit cost in the absence of taxation. 
Therefore, a single tax instrument (an excise) is all that is required to 
adjust the single target, Q (without disturbing the optimal level of q). 
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In contrast, neither Q nor n are generally adjusted appropriately in 
monopolistically competitive markets without taxation. Two instruments 
(taxes), therefore, are generally needed to simultaneously adjust the two 
targets. 
Among monopolistically competitive industries, in the absence of price 
competition, output per-firm is too small in the original long-run equilib­
rium. Taxes which encourage firms to expand production must be used to 
move the industry into the optimal taxation region. If firms behave as 
price competitors, optimal taxation may require either a larger or smaller 
output per-firm depending on where the original long-run equilibrium is 
located and on the required collections level. In either case, once out­
put per-firm is appropriately adjusted, the industry sales level (or the 
number of firms) must also be adjusted. 
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CHAPTER V. MONOPOLY 
We now proceed to examine optimal taxation in markets characterized by 
monopoly. It will be assumed that the taxing authority has three tax in­
struments: unit or ad valorem excise taxes and a profit tax. Profit taxes 
were not considered earlier since free entry into perfectly competitive and 
monopolistically competitive industries ensures that long-run economic 
profit is zero. A single-plant monopolist is analyzed; therefore, license 
fees essentially constitute a profits tax. Moreover, the approach used to 
examine the optimal taxation path differs from that utilized in previous 
chapters. The optimal path is described only by the adjustment of industry 
sales, since the number of firms plays no role given a single-plant monopo­
list. 
In the next section, the optimal taxation path is derived and exam­
ined. All points on this path, except the end point corresponding to maxi­
mal taxation, require higher output levels than produced by the monopolist 
in the absence of taxation. The adjustment of the monopolist to various 
taxes is considered next. Single taxation schemes are shown to be ineffi­
cient, except for the singular case of maximal taxation, and the optimal 
multiple taxation scheme is determined. 
The Optimal Taxation Path 
The procedure used to characterize the optimal path in Chapters III 
and IV is not appropriate for monopoly. First, both the social welfare 
from the industry and total collections are determined solely by the level 
of industry sales. We assume the monopolist operates a single plant and 
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produces a single homogeneous product, Q. Therefore, the number of firms 
(or the level of variety) plays no role here.. Second, the monopolist may 
enjoy positive long-run economic profit because of entry barriers. While 
industry profit is not, therefore, necessarily equal to total tax collec­
tions, profits do constitute maximal potential collections for any sales 
level. That is, industry profit can always be extracted by a 100% profits 
tax. 
Social welfare from the industry and the potential collections func­
tion (or industry profits) are defined by the level of industry sales. The 
optimal taxation path is characterized by the adjustment of industry sales 
necessary to maximize welfare as required collections are increased. Let 
P(Q) (where P'(Q) < 0) be the inverse demand function faced by the monopo­
list where Q represents sales. The monopolist incurs production cost equal 
to C(Q) and marginal costs (MC) are increasing (i.e., MC=C'(Q) > 0 and 
C"(Q) >0).^  Profits (IT) are maximized at that output level where marginal 
cost equals marginal revenue (MR), or 
(V-1) TT = P(Q)Q - C(Q) 
and (V-2) ir' = P(Q)+P'(Q)Q - C'(Q) = MR-MC = 0. 
The long-run equilibrium position of the monopolist in the absence of taxa­
tion (Q^ ) is illustrated in Figure V-1, assuming a linear demand and a 
quadratic cost structure. The potential tax collections function (industry 
I^t is assumed that the private costs of the monopolist are also so­
cial costs. In particular, the increasing marginal cost of the monpolist 
is not the result of the monopolist recognizing some effect that his pur­
chases of inputs have on input prices and rents to suppliers. That is, 
the monopolist is not an oligopsonist or monopsonist purchaser of inputs 
for his production process. 
67 
p 
.HC 
AC 
0 Q, Q 
m w 
Figure V-1. A single-plant monopolist 
Figure V-2. Single and multiple tax collection functions 
!i 
0 Q. Q, Q 
'm 'w 
Figure V-3. The social welfare function 
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profits) is defined by equation (V-1) and illustrated in Figure V-2. 
Since the monopolist maximizes his profit in the absence of taxation, po­
tential collections are maximized at No tax collections can be ex­
tracted when sales are zero (Q=0) or when price equals average cost (AC) at 
Q=QQ. AS Figure V-2 illustrates, there are generally two sales levels 
which yield the same potential collections. The optimal sales level is 
that which maximizes social welfare from the industry defined by (assuming 
collections are rebated in a lump-sum fashion) 
Similar to previous analysis, welfare from the industry is equal to gross 
consumer benefits minus production cost. This function is illustrated in 
Figure V-3. Its slope equals 
and it reaches a maximum when P=MC, illustrated by point w (where Q=Qw). 
The optimal taxation path can be derived by combining Figures V-2 and 
V-3. First, note that output levels less than or greater than cannot 
possibly lie on the optimal path. If output is less than Q^ , both collec-
Similarly, both collections and welfare are increased by reducing output in 
excess of Q^ . The optimal path, therefore, lies between the output level 
chosen by the monopolist in the absence of taxation (Q^ )^ and the output 
level where welfare is maximized (Q^ )• The most that can be collected by 
taxes is maximal monopoly profit (R^ ), which leaves the monopolist with 
(V-3) P(k)dk - C(Q) 
0 
(V-3a)  ^= P - C'(Q) = P-MC, 
tions and welfare can be simultaneously increased by expanding sales. 
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normal returns at point z in Figure V-2. For optimal collection of lesser 
amounts, output must be increased toward Q^ . The monopolist continues to 
earn normal returns (moves from point z to point v in Figure V-2) and col­
lections are reduced toward along the segment Tu. The expansion of 
sales increases welfare from point Y to a maximum at point w in Figure V-3. 
Point u in Figure V-2 and point w in Figure V-3 represent one endpoint of 
the optimal path. That is, a positive amount of collections is raised as 
a result of maximizing welfare. For the entire economy, these excess col­
lections can be used to cover the subsidy required to maximize welfare from 
monopolistically competitive industries. 
Formally, points on the optimal taxation path are determined by choos­
ing that sales level, for any given level of collections (R), which maxi­
mizes the following Lagrangean function, 
(V-4) dC = B +X(R-R). 
Assuming a 100% profits tax is levied, tax collections are equal to monopo­
ly profit. Thus, 
(V-5) 
0 
and it is maximized when 
(V=5a) P-MC -X(MR-MC) = 0 
and (V-5b) M = R - P(Q)Q-C(Q) = 0. 
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Equation (V-5b) simply ensures that the collections requirement is satis­
fied and equation (V-5a) stipulates that 
(V_6) X . P-MC 
MR-MC 
In Chapter II, it was shown that X must be negative to satisfy the 
conditions of optimal taxation. This implies that P-MC and MR-MC must be 
of opposite signs which occurs only if output is greater than Qj^  and less 
than Q^ . Essentially, taxation schemes are not optimal if they induce the 
industry to operate on the pareto-inferior side of the tax collections 
function (i.e., Q <Qjjj) or on the pareto-inferior side of the welfare func­
tion (i.e., Q >Q^ ). Consequently, the optimal path lies between and 
which supports our earlier conclusions. 
Optimal Taxation Schemes 
In the absence of taxation, the monopolist operates at the peak of its 
profit function represented by point T in Figure V-2. With the exception 
of maximal collections, optimal taxation schemes must induce the monopolist 
to expand sales. To determine what tax or combination of taxes this re­
quires, we need to examine the adjustment of the monopolist to each form of 
taxation. 
If all three tax instruments are used, monopoly profit is 
(V-7) TT = [p(Q)Q(l-s) -C(Q) -tq] (1-t^ ) 
where t^  represents the rate of profit taxation. The monopolist chooses 
that output where 
(V-8) IT' = MR(l-s) -MC -t = 0, 
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such that his net (of tax) profit is maximized. This equation shows how 
the monopolist reacts to each tax. As is commonly known, profits taxation 
does not affect the marginal condition of the monopolist. As t^  is in­
creased, industry sales remain unaltered at and collections are in­
creased from zero at point z to a maximum (E^ ) at point T in Figure V-2. 
Since profit taxation does not alter output, it only represents an optimal 
tax if one desires to maximize collections. Although any potential collec­
tion level can be raised with a profits tax, all but the maximum amount 
could be raised while increasing welfare with an alternative scheme. 
Next, consider a single unit excise tax. The per-unit excise rate 
at any level of sales is determined from equation (V-8) by setting s=0 and 
solving for t, or 
(V-9) t = MR-MC. 
The unit excise collections function is illustrated in Figure V-2 by R^ . 
It originates from Qjjj (where MR=MC) and lies everywhere below the monopo­
list profit function. That is, the per-unit excise rate (t = MR-MC) is 
less than the per-unit profit rate (i.e., P-AC) at every sales level. 
Figures V-2 and V-3 illustrate the inefficiency of single unit excise 
taxes. Their revenue potential is less than a profits tax and, since they 
reduce sales, welfare is less than it is with a profits tax. 
The effect of ad valorem excise taxes on a monopolists* output is 
similar to that of unit excise taxes, but the tax collections potential of 
ad valorem excise is larger than unit excises. The effective per-unit ad 
valorem rate (i.e., sP) is determined from equation (V-8) by setting t=0 
and solving for sP, or 
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(V-10) sP = (MR-SP'(Q)Q) - MC. 
For any positive ad valorem rate, MR-sP'(Q)Q >MR and MR-sP'(Q)Q = P only 
if s=l. That is, MR-sP'(Q)Q must lie between the marginal revenue and de­
mand schedules as illustrated in Figure V-1. For any sales level, ad 
valorem excise collections (Rg) are greater than unit, excise collections 
(R^ ), but less than gross-of-tax industry profit (ir). That is, MR-MC < 
MR-sP'(Q)Q-MC <P-AC, such that R^  <Rg <Tt which is illustrated in Figure V-2. 
A higher level of welfare can be obtained with ad valorem excise taxes 
than with an equal-yield unit excise tax. However, either tax results in 
a lower level of welfare than an equal-yield profits tax. 
Use of single excise taxes under conditions of monopoly have an in­
teresting implication for the Laffer hypothesis. Use of either excise can 
move the industry along an upward-sloping portion of a single excise col­
lections function (i.e., along the "right-side" of a Laffer hill). How­
ever, the industry is simultaneously being moved into the "prohibitive 
range" along the potential multiple-tax collections function. That is, 
while the taxing authority perceives that it is on the correct side of a 
Laffer curve, any use of excise taxes alone puts the industry over the 
Laffer hill into the prohibitive and sub-optimal range along the multiple-
tax collections function. Consequently, single excises are never pareto 
optimal in markets characterized by monopoly. In fact, no single tax can 
move the industry along its optimal path. Optimal taxation requires a 
combination of taxes if collections are anything less than maximal. 
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With the exception of maximal collections, the monopolist must be in­
duced to expand production to move the industry along its optimal path. A 
profits tax does not alter output and excise taxes reduce it. Therefore, 
excise subsidies must be used to encourage the monopolist to expand output 
and operate where MC >MR. Since excise subsidies cannot possibly satisfy 
a positive collections requirement, they must be combined with a profits 
tax. The excise subsidy can expand sales and raise welfare while required 
collections can be realized by profit taxation. 
The subsidy required to expand sales to any level is determined by 
rewriting equation (V-8) as 
(V-11) t + sMR = MR-MC. 
Thus, any excise scheme such that t+sMR <0 will expand output. For sim­
plicity, assume s=0 and that a single unit excise subsidy is used. Combin­
ing a unit excise subsidy equal to MC(Q„)-MR(Q^ ) with a 100% profits tax 
yields tax collections of (i.e., point U in Figure II-2), expands output 
to Q^ , yields the monopolist only normal returns (i.e., point v in Figure 
V-2), and maximizes welfare (point w in Figure V-3). This represents the 
position of the industry at one endpoint on its optimal path. Reducing the 
excise subsidy while maintaining a 100% tax on profits moves the industry 
along the remaining portion of its optimal path. Output falls as the sub­
sidy is reduced and the increase in potential collection is extracted by 
the profits tax. That is, collections are increased from R^  (at point u) 
to a maximum of R^  (at point T). The 100% profits tax ensures only 
normal returns for the monopolist (i.e., net monopoly profit moves from 
point V to point z), and welfare is reduced from a maximum at point w to 
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point Y. Optimal taxation for ail but maximal collections, therefore, re­
quires at least two taxes: an excise subsidy (a unit, an ad valorem, or 
some combination) and a 100% profits tax. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
Most analyses concerning optimal commodity taxation has been restricted 
to taxation in an economy consisting of only perfectly competitive indus­
tries. Since, in such industries, a single excise tax is optimal, the use 
of other taxes or a combination of taxes bias received very little atten­
tion. Rather, the major focus has been on whether a uniform or a differ­
ential excise rate structure is required. In this paper, we have consid­
ered taxation in an economy where both perfectly and imperfectly competi­
tive industries exist together. It was shown that the type of tax or taxes 
required for optimal commodity taxation is highly dependent on the struc­
ture of the market which is taxed. If attention is restricted to perfect­
ly competitive industries, the optimal type of tax is not an issue and the 
focus has been reduced to the optimal configuration of rates among indus­
tries. However, if various types of competitive markets exist, then the 
optimal choice of tax instruments for each type of industry becomes a major 
issue which has been the focus of this paper. 
For perfectly competitive industries, optimal taxation requires equal 
proportionate reductions of industry sales and the number of firms so that 
output per-firm remains constant as collections are increased. Either ex­
cise tax or their appropriate combination can accomplish this and move the 
industry along its optimal path. Licenses by themselves or in combination 
with excise taxes are not warranted for revenue purposes. They induce a 
production inefficiency by encouraging firms to expand output. Consequent­
ly, their revenue potential is surpassed by excise taxation. 
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In contrast to perfectly competitive industries, imperfectly competi­
tive industries operate pareto inefficiently in the absence of taxation. 
Optimal taxation must, therefore, move such industries first onto and then 
along their optimal paths. For monopolistically competitive industries, 
the maximization of social welfare requires a net subsidy. The optimal ad­
justment of the industry from the point of maximal welfare to the point of 
maximum collections (i.e., the optimal taxation path) depends on the spe­
cific characteristics of the market. It may require both the industry 
sales level and the level of variety (i.e., the number of firms) to fall or 
the level of variety to increase while the sales level falls as collections 
are increased. Finally, and surprisingly, optimal taxation may require 
both the level of variety and the level of industry sales to rise as col­
lections are increased. Moreover, because such industries operate pareto 
inefficiently in the absence of taxation, it may be possible to raise a 
substantial level of collections while simultaneously increasing welfare. 
Whether the market is characterized by price or nonprice competitive be­
havior, a combination of taxes is generally required to move the industry 
along its optimal path. Intuitively, both the level of industry sales and 
the level of variety need to be adjusted appropriately. Therefore, while a 
single tax may move the industry to a given point on its optimal path, gen­
erally at least two taxes are required to simultaneously adjust these two 
targets. Two taxes are also generally required to maximize collections 
when the industry is price competitive. However, a single license fee has 
an unsurpassed revenue potential in nonprice competitive markets. 
For markets characterized by a single-plant monopolist, all points on 
the optimal taxation path (with the exception of the point of maximal 
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collections) require a larger sales level than produced in the absence of 
taxation. Collections can be maximized by a 100% profits tax, while all 
other points on the optimal path require the combination of a 100% profits 
tax and an excise subsidy. The use of single excise schemes is clearly 
suboptimal, since they push the industry to the wrong-side of the collec­
tions mound. 
In general, when the economy is characterized by both perfectly and 
imperfectly competitive industries, more than one type of tax instrument 
and a combination of taxes are required. Moreover, while subsidies are not 
required in perfectly competitive industries, they are needed in a market 
characterized by a monopoly and may be required in monopolistically com­
petitive industries. Finally, it is interesting to note that, although 
single taxes can sometimes maximize collections, in most cases a combina­
tion of taxes is required for optimal taxation. 
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